

# smiles



## Baseline study

Country report – Spain



**Platoniq**

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## Colophon

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# :: Part 1 ::

## Disinformation and COVID-19 in the Spanish State

### Hoaxes, fake news, and disinformation

#### The phenomenon of disinformation

In 1984, the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language (RAE) defined "disinformation" as "to give information intentionally manipulated to serve certain ends"<sup>(1)</sup>.

Disinformation is not a new phenomenon<sup>(2)</sup> and Ryszard Kapuscinski narrates it perfectly in Lapidarium IV: "Since it was discovered that information is a product that provides succulent profits, it is no longer subject to the traditional criteria of truth and lies"<sup>(3)</sup>.

Throughout history, disinformation has played a decisive role<sup>(1)</sup>. We find documented examples of disinformation in the strategies used by the British and the Allies in World War I<sup>(4)</sup>, in the British elections of the 1920s<sup>(1)</sup> or, more recently, in the last Spanish general elections<sup>(5)</sup> and in the election race between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in 2016, where it became evident that massively distributed lies are a very powerful propaganda weapon<sup>(6, 7)</sup>.

In today's cyber society, the phenomenon of disinformation has become globalized. The evolution and implementation of technologies has allowed many people to access information distribution tools all over the world, thus increasing the number of senders<sup>(8, 9)</sup>. This obviously has positive consequences in terms of citizen participation, but also negative ones in terms of the distribution of false news<sup>(10)</sup>.

While social media has become a mainstay for staying updated on the news, the consolidation of easily usable social networks, such as Twitter and Facebook, has allowed the growth of fake news<sup>(6)</sup>, which, moreover, spread faster and to a greater extent than real news<sup>(11, 12)</sup>. The combination of these factors is worrying in countries such as Spain, where 60% of the population avoids news when surfing the Internet, ranking among the advanced EU countries with the least amount of journalism consulted on the Internet<sup>(11, 13)</sup>. In fact, the public in this country has shown itself to be very porous to disinformation, which is also to be expected given its tradition of political polarization<sup>(11, 14)</sup>.

## Disinformation, hoax, or fake news?

When we talk about disinformation, we tend to use the expression "fake news". This term is of concern to the academic world because it is conceptually and epistemologically confusing <sup>(15)</sup>, since the phenomenon goes beyond news — encompassing the entire information ecosystem— and falsehood, a term that fails to describe the complexity of the different types of misinformation and disinformation <sup>(16)</sup>. Moreover, the term "fake news" has a wide variety of definitions that do not allow reaching a universal agreement on where the problem lies and how to frame it <sup>(17)</sup>.

On the other hand, from a journalistic point of view, "fake news" is an unacceptable oxymoron, since a deliberately and self-interestedly false text or statement can never be considered "news". If it is false, it is not news; and if it is news (and therefore there has been verification of content), it is not false <sup>(18)</sup>.

In this sense, organizations such as the European Commission or UNESCO have preferred to avoid the term "fake news" and opt for the expression "information disorders" <sup>(16)</sup>, which includes <sup>(19)</sup>:

- disinformation: deliberate creation and dissemination of false information, spread for economic, ideological or some other reason,
- misinformation: unintentional dissemination of false information,
- mal-information: true but restricted or private information disseminated to do harm.

In Spain, the term "bulo" has been widely used, defined by the RAE as "false news propagated for some purpose", a definition that can be expanded as: "any intentionally false content with a true appearance, conceived with the purpose of misleading the public, and publicly disseminated by any platform or social media" <sup>(19)</sup>.

# Disinformation in the times of COVID-19

## Infodemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated an unprecedented health and communication crisis <sup>(20)</sup>. In early 2020, the World Health Organization warned of an "infodemic" superimposed on the coronavirus pandemic <sup>(19)</sup>, which it defined as:

"an overabundance of information —some accurate and some not— that makes it difficult for people to find credible and reliable sources"

(WHO, 2 February 2020)

During the pandemic, the consumption of news by the public increased markedly <sup>(21)</sup>. In Spain, the volume of news in the digital media increased considerably since the state of alert was declared <sup>(22)</sup>. The report on "Consumption of information during coronavirus confinement" highlights that more than 80% of the people surveyed admitted having received false news or news of doubtful veracity about the pandemic <sup>(23, 24)</sup>. In fact, a survey conducted in March and April 2020 by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism <sup>(25)</sup> indicated that, among six countries analysed, Spain was the place where most people reported the problem of having seen misleading content about the pandemic, both on social networks and messaging applications <sup>(19)</sup>.

The massive circulation of false, inaccurate, or decontextualized information about the coronavirus <sup>(20)</sup> combined with the uncertainty of the pandemic situation has provided the perfect conditions for the creation and dissemination of misinformation <sup>(25)</sup>. In addition, a significant increase in misinformation has been identified as the pandemic unfolded <sup>(23)</sup>.

## Characteristics of hoaxes

Most of the disinformation about COVID-19 is not based on invention, but on the reconfiguration, recontextualization or distortion of pre-existing materials <sup>(26)</sup>.

Four types of hoaxes have been identified, which show a certain degree of overlap: pranks, exaggerations, decontextualization, and hoaxes <sup>(19)</sup>. Exaggeration is common in political debate, while decontextualization is often linked to photographic or video formats. Hoax encompasses various types of falsifications, and it should be considered that, in order for the recipient to believe the deception, he/she must accept the "epistemological authority" of the person issuing the message <sup>(27)</sup>. This principle is skilfully handled by hoaxers, who, through impersonation, combine a real element (the source itself) with a false one (the information), thus making it difficult to detect the hoax, and the impersonation of commercial brands is particularly frequent

<sup>(19)</sup>.

The most frequent sources are precisely the supplanted and anonymous ones, where the source of the information is not disclosed; while the least frequent are the real ones, where the natural or legal person is correctly identified, and the fictitious ones, those whose identity is imaginary or fabricated <sup>(19)</sup>.

In terms of subject matter, although the public has a higher level of trust in scientific messages than in political messages <sup>(28)</sup>, during the pandemic a large number of hoaxes about health and science have been generated, as well as numerous false political and governmental contents <sup>(19)</sup>.

On the one hand, the combination of "express science" with the media has led to the publication of articles of low quality but of great relevance or public repercussion, or to articles being interpreted out of context or erroneously by non-specialists, encouraging the appearance of hoaxes <sup>(19)</sup>. The most recurrent misleading contents in terms of health and science have been those related to the different ways of preventing and detecting the spread of the virus, and the drugs that can or cannot be taken in the presence of symptoms <sup>(10)</sup>. In this area, it is important to incorporate the culture of content curation, understanding that the academic world must create, generate, and disseminate quality knowledge to reverse possible waves of scientific misinformation <sup>(11)</sup>.

On the other hand, the coronavirus has served as a weapon for political and partisan battle, being the disinformation in relation to the pandemic strongly politicized <sup>(19)</sup>. Unlike other countries, in Spain there has not been a complete alignment of the political forces behind the government, but rather a blame game about the political responsibilities for the crisis, in which each political force has tried to create its own framework and communication strategy <sup>(29)</sup>.

At the geographical level, there seems to be a relationship between the content of hoaxes and their territorial scope. In the international sphere, the main contents are related to science and health, while at the national level, politics is the generator of the largest number of hoaxes <sup>(19)</sup>. There is a tendency to internationalize hoaxes by localizing pieces generated in Spain in other countries, establishing global narratives in specific local cases <sup>(23)</sup>.

In terms of platforms, it is confirmed that social networks, whether closed or open, are the main environment for the dissemination of hoaxes. WhatsApp is the platform where most hoaxes are observed, followed by Twitter and, at a greater distance, Facebook and YouTube <sup>(19)</sup>. It is particularly surprising that platforms such as WhatsApp or Facebook, considered to be of low reliability because they are more likely to generate hoaxes, are, in Spain, two of the main channels of access to information <sup>(10)</sup>. On the other hand, social media have realized that the lack of reliability in the content they disseminate is a threat to their own existence <sup>(6)</sup>, since a platform or social network in which users doubt whether the information they consult is true is a network that will become weaker and weaker <sup>(11)</sup>.

## Communication during the pandemic

The management of institutional communication has been characterized by the permanent presence of the Spanish government to provide information, controlling, at all times, the topics and frames <sup>(30)</sup>. The use of a language of war, associated with national unity, stands out and is surprising <sup>(10)</sup>. Although the Spanish police issued a guide to prevent citizens from being manipulated with false information <sup>(31)</sup>, when political communication puts the emotional before the rational, the success of disinformation is guaranteed <sup>(10)</sup>.

The institutional communication strategy has been based on the media, without a real interaction with the citizenry <sup>(10)</sup>. We are, however, in a context in which there is a problem of credibility towards power (political parties and public institutions) and the media <sup>(10)</sup>, derived from the problems of information ethics that are observed because of public-private collaboration <sup>(32)</sup>. According to studies carried out in Spain on the pandemic, the media are conditioned by their editorial line when reporting on the coronavirus, with an ideological bias that can constitute a bridge to disinformation <sup>(33)</sup>, increasing uncertainty and distrust in the media <sup>(10)</sup>. This is devastating for social trust, since the lack of independence prevents journalists from telling proven facts without yielding to personal, advertising, or ideological interests <sup>(18)</sup>.

On the other hand, in this new digital framework, professional information coexists with amateur information <sup>(34)</sup>, and includes new actors who are not subject to traditional standards of veracity <sup>(35)</sup> and who can disseminate unverified content on the networks <sup>(32)</sup>. These new actors carry out a communicative activity loaded with emotive elements, which alter the values associated with the journalistic profession <sup>(32, 36)</sup>, and have an emotional impact on users in what is known as "emotional contagion" <sup>(32)</sup>.



Guide against "fake news" by the Spanish police



## Impact of disinformation

Disinformation is a major threat in countries where the use of social networks is high and traditional institutions are weak <sup>(20)</sup> and affects multiple social dimensions such as the political system, international relations, and climate change policies <sup>(19)</sup>.

Political instability and high levels of politicization in countries such as Spain, coupled with uncertainty about the pandemic, have facilitated the circulation of false information through messaging systems and social networks <sup>(20)</sup>. Although the communicative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are an ongoing process <sup>(32)</sup>, in a survey conducted in Spain most respondents attributed a high level of impact to COVID-19-related hoaxes, considering the social impact generated by the resulting alarm situation to be serious or very serious <sup>(10)</sup>. Another survey found that people with low levels of education were less likely to say they relied on the media for news and information about the coronavirus and more likely to rely on social networks and messaging applications <sup>(23, 25)</sup>.

The proliferation of hoaxes and health misinformation during the pandemic has generated a climate of mistrust that has prevented citizens from distinguishing fact from fiction <sup>(25)</sup>, undermined the credibility of democratic institutions <sup>(32)</sup>, and undermined public confidence in the media <sup>(18)</sup>.

We are, moreover, facing a scenario in which it is difficult to manage the uncertainty of the population, since one of the main actors in the system, the media, does not have a sufficient reputation and is valued as an instrument of manipulation at the service of the economic elites <sup>(37)</sup>. And in a context of uncertainty, disinformation multiplies and expands, contributing negatively to the atmosphere of trustworthiness necessary for the management of a crisis of these characteristics <sup>(38)</sup>.

# Combating disinformation

To deal with misinformation, experts insist on the need to disseminate manuals or codes of good practice and consider that citizen training, media and digital literacy and the creation of critical awareness are the only ways to combat infodemic <sup>(10)</sup>.

In this regard, it is suggested that policies should be aimed at training in digital skills, rather than restricting or prohibiting access, and the key role of libraries and library staff is highlighted to support users in their search for information and offer services to increase reading skills <sup>(6)</sup>. A double challenge is identified: how to determine the degree of trust of an information source, and how to try to reverse the situation as much as possible <sup>(6)</sup>. Below we present two strategies that, in our opinion, can respond to these challenges.

## Media and information literacy

"Information literacy is the ability to think critically and make balanced judgments about any information we encounter and use. It is empowering us as citizens to reach and express informed views and engage fully with society" (Cilim, 2018) <sup>(6)</sup>

Media education appears as a condition that is not sufficient but absolutely necessary to change the state of things <sup>(6)</sup>. In this sense, the proactive public commitment of educators, librarians and media professionals is necessary to promote media literacy practices and train critical users <sup>(6)</sup>.

To this end, some tools are proposed to be developed in the field of education, which can be easily extrapolated to other groups <sup>(39)</sup>:

- criteria for evaluating news and other sources of information,
- use fact checking websites (fact checkers),
- read reputable sources,
- seek different perspectives,
- practice media literacy,
- reduce the sharing of dubious news,
- support and commit to high quality journalism.

At the school level, another proposal is to use digital platforms collegially with European institutions and in collaboration with teachers to implement a critical use of information among the new generations <sup>(32)</sup>.

On the other hand, actions oriented to the library field are also proposed <sup>(6)</sup>:

- have online training materials with examples of fake news and reliable sources of information,

- disseminate data verification services and create avenues for collaboration with the public,
- organize practical workshops on hoax detection,
- strengthen collections, especially digital ones, with subscriptions to high quality media,
- establish synergies with communication professionals to create common projects,
- reinforce the library staff's knowledge of professional codes of ethics to help them define acquisition policies.

The second part of this study identifies and maps media literacy resources aimed at young people, teachers and/or library staff in Spain.

## Verification platforms

Disinformation strategies are imposed when journalists and citizens do not have verification mechanisms for each discourse or statement. Hence the importance given to "fact checking" as a tool to combat disinformation <sup>(18)</sup>.

Fact-checking platforms are verification projects that check information a posteriori <sup>(19)</sup>, and a massive growth of these platforms has been detected on the occasion of Covid-19 <sup>(20)</sup>. In an uncertain and changing scenario, characterized by infodemia, these platforms have emerged as relevant actors in the fight against coronavirus-related disinformation both in Spain and Latin America <sup>(20)</sup>.

There are two models of fact-checking organizations: those driven by the media (newsroom model) and those created independently (NGO model) <sup>(20)</sup>. In the first case, the fact that content curation is carried out by private fact-checking companies and is sometimes financed by large Internet corporations opens an ethical debate on information neutrality <sup>(32)</sup>.

In Spain, the following platforms have been identified: Maldita.es, Newtral, EFE Verifica, AFP Factual (which covers six other Latin American countries), Verificat, RTVE Verifica, and #saludsinbulos of Con Salud, with the first five being accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) <sup>(40)</sup>. To be accredited, organizations must be characterized by impartiality, transparency, and an open and honest corrections policy <sup>(20)</sup>.

Fact-checking organizations have been able to leverage social networks to combat online misinformation and encourage participation <sup>(20)</sup>. However, while in one study 73.5% of respondents claimed to check fake news, only 10% claimed to use fact-checking systems <sup>(24)</sup>.

# :: Part 2 ::

## Digital media education: existing resources and methodologies

### Objective and method

The aim of this part is to map, register and take stock of the various types of tools, resources, campaigns, and workshops developed to inform and educate young people about digital disinformation in Spain. The goal is to gain insight into different approaches, specifically in Spain, to develop new interventions that provide young people with new knowledge and tools to resist and dismantle disinformation.

The scope of this study was primarily young people around 12-15 year old. With a focus on youth this study also investigated resources and tools developed for schools and libraries with the view that these centres would be salient nodes for both dissemination, trainings, and workshops. Towards this end the following questions were posed to search for activities and resources:

- (1) What initiatives, courses and training tools are there and librarians, dealing with media and digital literacy, disinformation, and the development of a critical spirit among students?
- (2) What training resources are available in Spain on media and digital literacy, disinformation and fake news aimed at young people between 12 and 15 years old?
- (3) What recommendations and lessons can we draw from these experiences to develop a new intervention aimed at young people on fake news and disinformation?

### Methodology for desk research

The desk research was completed initially through a broad search through google. As a result of this search certain websites such as [learntocheck.org](https://learntocheck.org) were identified that provide information on training initiatives and have salient resource repositories that provide numerous activities and tools. The search criteria for key terms is listed in the table in the following section.

For a resource or activity to be included as a relevant subject of study it needed to meet the following criteria:

- The main objective of the intervention is directly related to misinformation and/or media and information literacy.
- The target persons are:
  - Teachers and / or librarians, when the initiative has a “train the trainers” format,
  - ESO (Compulsory Secondary Education) students and adolescents between 12 and 16 years of age.
- The initiatives are developed within the Spanish territory. In the case of digital resources, these are available in Spanish.

### Search Criteria

← AND →				Search languages
↑ O R ↓	Intervention	Disinformation	Adolescents	Spanish
	Training	Fake news	Students	Catalan
	Course	Media Literacy	Young People	
	Books		Teachers	
	Materials		School	
	Resources		Library	

Interventions found were then analysed and categorised according to the following characteristics:

- Intervention name and link
- Brief description
- Type of intervention
- Provider entity
- Topic(s) addressed
- Target people
- Type of training: formal, non-formal, informal
- Duration
- Methodology

## Interview methodology

The interview is a basic element as a qualitative research method and, as such, there are several methods. For the purposes of this study, a semi-structured interview methodology has been employed to provide an in-depth look at how some of the mapped interventions have been developed, the impact they have had, the results and lessons learned.

The questionnaire has been developed based on the experience of the researchers in conducting interviews with professionals in the field of education, as well as in the development of campaigns. The questionnaires have been based on knowing in detail the experience of the interviewee, in which relevant training initiatives he/she has been involved in the field of misinformation, and what recommendations, lessons learned, and difficulties have arisen.

The interviewees have been selected based on their experience in research, development, and implementation of media literacy programs for youth and teachers in Spain from 2020 to date.

The audio of both interviews has been recorded in order to extract, later on, the highlighted information. We have not made a literal transcription of the interview, but an extract of the relevant ideas, points and experiences, the digestion of which is presented in the results section.

# Desk research results

## Training Teachers and Librarians

While many teacher training initiatives were identified throughout Spain, few were targeted at librarians. Most activities found fell under the umbrella of remote training courses and workshops as well as didactic guides that promoted the development of critical thinking and analytical skills amongst students.

### Training courses and workshops

Eight training courses have been mapped to combat disinformation and promote media education in classrooms and/or libraries, seven for teachers and only one for librarians. The trainings share common objectives, of which the following stand out:

- To train participants on the concepts and characteristics of the phenomenon of disinformation, its types, causes and consequences.
- To introduce the concept of digital verification, its operation, techniques, and tools, as well as to provide materials and pedagogical resources to work on media education in digital verification in the classroom.
- To offer methodological and didactic strategies to develop critical thinking in students, as well as to transfer knowledge and experience to the classroom.

Based on these shared objectives, and more specific ones depending on the initiative, each training program establishes its own program. These programs differ in length and number of modules, but generally have a similar structure:

- The first module(s) are devoted to introducing and defining the key concepts related to disinformation (including terms such as fake news, deepfakes, hoax, post-truth, or manipulation) and describing its types, causes, dangers and consequences.
- The following modules are aimed at explaining strategies and initiatives to combat disinformation: from digital verification, its keys, tools, and platforms; to methods and case studies to discover false content and/or analyse social accounts.
- The trainings then focus on providing ideas and resources to combat misinformation in the classroom: materials and tools for media education, workbooks, and practical exercises to apply with students.
- Some initiatives dedicate the last module to a debate or a practical workshop related to fake news.

At the methodological level, the training courses usually combine defining the concept with a video followed by a discussion and practical exercises.

## Didactic Guides

The desk research has identified the following institutions or institutional programmes that offer relevant instructive material applicable in Spain that provide guidance and resources for teachers to work on media education in the classroom.

UNESCO offers the "Media and Information Literacy" (MLI) program which, although it does not explicitly address the issue of misinformation, is considered "one of the most important prerequisites for fostering equitable access to information and knowledge, and for promoting free, independent and plural media and information systems". In this guide we find two main blocks: (1) curriculum and competency framework and (2) core and optional modules.

EduCAC presents a broad curriculum for critical media analysis, with twelve didactic units, three transversal itineraries and four support modules for teachers. In the field of misinformation, we highlight the third unit "Who do I believe?", which includes four didactic units, a classroom project and three tutorials.

Be Critical is an educational program for media competence and critical thinking offered by Educaixa, and includes a pedagogical orientation guide for students in the first and second levels of compulsory secondary education (ESO).

The Learn to Check platform offers, among its many interesting resources on disinformation, the teaching guide "Images: if I see it, I don't believe it either", created for teachers who want to bring to the classroom methodologies to identify falsified images.

"Get Your Facts Straight" is a toolkit for educators and trainers, the result of a European project on media literacy education through workshops on misinformation for young people and their parents. The document includes learning objectives, training outline, learning materials, recommendations and lessons learned from a pilot test.

(In)fórmate offers several videos about the process of creating and distributing information in various media and contexts, from the vision of a war reporter to a youtuber, including traditional media. Along with each video a didactic proposal is offered to work with students.

The "Vaccinate yourself against misinformation" initiative is one of the few mapped interventions aimed at library staff. It is a series of webinars organized by BiblioMadSalud that deals with scientific publishing and health information resources.

Finally, "Educating the Classroom on Fake News" is a manual book for teachers that provides fundamental information on the subject and includes a workbook with specific and practical exercises on *fake news* to carry out with students.



## Training resources for young people

The most notable and developed training resources for youth within the specific age group of 12-15 that touched on digital literacy, fake news, and disinformation were training courses, workshops, games, and videos. By and large these resources were available digitally.

### Training courses and workshops

Six organizations that offer training workshops to adolescents and secondary school students were identified. Among the trainings they offer, four require in person training at school and two are available digitally. The trainings are contracted by governmental entities and are often tailored to a certain extent to the specific needs set in the contract. They are then implemented by the providers (Maldita, Learn to Check, Javi Polinario, Junior Report) of the training in educational institutions or libraries. The duration is variable and generally ranges from one to three hours.

These trainings share the following common objectives:

- To promote a critical spirit and thinking among young people,
- To train the participants on the phenomenon of disinformation, learn to identify its multiple forms and reflect on its causes and consequences,
- To provide students with techniques and practical tools that allow identifying false news and verifying the truthfulness of information.

Although the trainings dedicate time to the initial theoretical-reflective explanation, all the workshops focus on analyzing practical cases of disinformation and putting into practice processes, guidelines, techniques and / or tools to verify various types of content, from information and photos to videos and social media accounts.

### Videos

Some audiovisual resources have been highlighted, although they are only a small part of the large number of videos that can be found in Spanish about fake news and disinformation on the Internet.

The mapped resources are animated videos suitable for all audiences, although the format and vocabulary are primarily for young people. The videos range from one to four minutes and emphasize on what disinformation is, its causes and consequences, as well as some basic techniques to verify the information received.

### Gamified Training

Learning by playing is a resource that has also been explored in some interventions. Three types of ludic initiatives have been mapped: a simple quiz-type game, a digital escape room and a graphic adventure for the classroom. The three initiatives deal with the phenomenon of disinformation through the different game types, all of them in digital format.

## Other initiatives


The Verificat Gen-Z project has developed an initiative with an innovative format: they have created a nascent community of fact-checkers made up of high school students from a school in Barcelona. In the first phase, the students learn to detect and verify content and then build communication channels through YouTube, Instagram and TikTok where they can share their experience and verifications.

Another initiative by Maldita shares a toolbox with basic tools to be able to check fake news; as well as a compilation of comics against scientific hoaxes under the title "Yo, Doctor". They also created the book "You don't play with fake news", intended for young people and complementary to a manual for teachers covered in the Didactic Guides section.


Finally, there is the awareness campaign "They don't fool me" by CAC (Audiovisual Council of Catalonia) with the aim of awakening a critical spirit and promoting good habits in the face of new forms of audiovisual and technological consumption. Although the campaign is aimed primarily at young people, its intention is to challenge the public with a message that empowers young people and adults in front of their screens.

## Summary of mapped training resources

Aimed at teachers and librarians:



Aimed at young people and adolescents:



## List of mapped training resources

Training resources for teachers and librarians						
Name hyperlinked	Brief description	Type of intervention	Provider Entity	Recipients	Type of education	Duration
<a href="#">Verification in the classroom: course for teachers</a>	Course on disinformation, how it affects society, processes and digital verification tools, and resources and proposals to apply in the classroom.	Face-to-face or distance courses	Learn to Check	Teachers	Non-formal	From 3h to 15h
<a href="#">Against fake news: digital verification in the classroom</a>	Training on the main characteristics of disinformation, verification techniques and tools in digital environments and resources to implement media education in digital verification in the classroom.	distance	FCRI	Secondary school teachers	Non-formal	10h
<a href="#">“Fake News” in the classroom, disinformation VS critical thinking</a>	Methodological proposal that takes advantage of the abundant current disinformation to develop the critical informational capacity of people in the educational context and contribute to their Media Literacy and Informational.	Distance course	CPR Plasencia	Teachers	Formal	10h
<a href="#">Educate in the classroom about Fake News</a>	Course about fake news where basic concepts, origin, categories, types of disinformation are discussed with examples, and how to teach about this topic.	Distance course	Telekids	Teachers	Non-formal	
<a href="#">disinformation, fake news and critical citizenship</a>	Course for teachers to update their training in the most innovative methodological approaches, providing new resources for their application in the classroom.	Distance course	Valencian Government - CEFIRE	Secondary school teachers	Formal	40h
<a href="#">Combating disinformation from libraries</a>	The objective of the training is to introduce participants to the techniques, tools, and resources of digital verification.	online	JIEB training	Librarians	Non-formal	2h

<a href="#">Fake news and media education</a>	Course on disinformation, consequences, and foundations of digital verification, among others.	Semi - face-to-face course	CEP IBSTEAM	Teachers	Non-formal	10h
<a href="#">Communication in the XXI century Fake News. Unmasking fake news</a>	Training teachers to become aware of the consequences of disinformation and the social significance of a well-informed mature citizenry and transferring knowledge and experience to the classroom.	Self-directed course	Canary Islands Government	Teachers	Formal	
<a href="#">eduCAC</a>	Curriculum for critical media analysis, with 12 didactic units, 3 transversal itineraries and 4 support modules	Curriculum for teachers	CAC	Teachers	Formal	
<a href="#">If I see it, I don't believe it</a>	Didactic guide for teachers for the identification of images falsified	Teaching guide	Learn to Check	Teachers	Non-formal	
<a href="#">(In) fórmate</a>	Several videos on the process of creating and distributing information in various media and contexts. Along with each video a didactic proposal is offered to work with the students.	Videos + didactic proposal	Fad & Google	Teachers	Non-formal	
<a href="#">Media and informational literacy</a>	This AMI Curriculum for Teachers represents a component of a comprehensive strategy to encourage societies to be literate in media and information.	Curriculum for teachers	UNESCO	Teachers	Formal	
<a href="#">Be Critical: Educational Program &amp; Guide</a>	Educational program for media competence and critical thinking	Educational program	eduCaixa	Teachers	Formal	
<a href="#">Vaccinate against disinformation</a>	Cycle of webinars on scientific publication and health information resources	Webinars	Biblio Mad Salud	Sanitarians and librarians	No formal	9h
<a href="#">Get your facts straight</a>	Toolkit for media literacy education that includes learning objectives, training scheme, learning materials and recommendations	Toolkit	Colectic and other	Educators and trainers	Non-formal	10h
<a href="#">Educating in the classroom about Fake News</a>	Manual for teachers with fundamental information on disinformation that includes a workbook with practical exercises	Book	Jacquelin Sánchez Carrero	Teachers	Non-formal	

Training resources for young people between 12 and 15 years old						
Name hyperlinked	Brief description	Type of intervention	Provider Entity	Recipients	Type of education	Duration
<a href="#">Don't be taken in</a>	The training aims to acquire concepts about disinformation, learn to identify its forms and reflect on its causes and consequences, as well as explain the techniques and tools of digital verification.	Face-to-face or online workshop	Learn to Check	ESO students, high school, and training cycles	Non-formal	1 to 3 hours
<a href="#">Without verification, do not share</a>	Course aimed at adolescents whose objective is to promote their critical spirit, teaching them to question and verify the information they receive daily in your screens	Online course	Raise your head & Newtral Education	ESO and Baccalaureate Students	Non-formal	
<a href="#">Workshop: Fake news. Not everything you see on the internet is true</a>	Course that aims to help people detect false news and thus avoid being deceived.	Face-to-face course	Javi Polinario	Adolescents and the elderly	Non-formal	1 hour (conference) or 1.5 hours (workshop)
<a href="#">Workshop on journalism and "fake news"</a>	In this workshop, critical reading of newspapers is worked, one learns to identify the 'fake news' and major current affairs are brought into the classroom.	Face-to-face course	Junior Report	ESO and Baccalaureate Students	Non-formal	2 hours
<a href="#">Learn to verify in social networks</a>	Maldita Educa offers tailor-made training in media literacy, critical culture and verification methodology and tools	Tailor-made training	Maldita	All audiences	Non-formal	
<a href="#">How to combat disinformation and false news</a>	Training in media literacy in the field of disinformation, misleading information and false news in the RRSS	Face-to-face course	Colectic	Young people and their families	Non-formal	10 hours
<a href="#">Keys to combat hoaxes and disinformation</a>	Online event in which talk with journalists, young people and famous youtubers about the importance of media literacy and critical thinking.	Online event	Fad & Google	Youth	Non-formal	1h

<a href="#">Videos Learn to Check</a>	Videos on topics related to digital verification	Video	Learn to Check	All audiences	Informal	
<a href="#">What do we do with so much false news on the Internet?</a>	Practices to deal with disinformation that circulates on the internet	Video	Magic Markers	All audiences	Informal	3:21
<a href="#">How not to fall into the traps of disinformation?</a>	This video describes various disinformation and media manipulation tactics used on the internet and provides tools to identify and defend against them.	Video	Centro Gabo	All publics	Informal	2:34
<a href="#">Manual so that you don't get into it</a>	Causes of disinformation and six rules to identify false news	Video	Maldito Bulo	All audiences	Informal	4:00
<a href="#">How to stop disinformation in times of coronavirus?</a>	It shows how to identify the unverified content that is received and how to avoid reproducing data through social networks that have not been checked by reliable sources.	Video	UNESCO	Youth	Informal	0:43
<a href="#">Quiz Fakes Quiz</a>	Videogame about false news	Quiz	Nuria Segura	Youth	Informal	
<a href="#">Breaking the wall</a>	Escape Room to dismantle fake news and prejudices about migrants and refugees	Escape Room	Alboan	All audiences	Informal	
<a href="#">(In) form - Eraser</a>	Gamified educational adventure, designed to train students to handle information in digital contexts.	Gamified training	Fad & Google	Secondary students	Non-formal	
<a href="#">Gen-Z / Desfake</a>	Project in which students learn to detect and verify the content that circulates on their networks with the idea that they build a YouTube channel and profiles on Instagram or TikTok to share their verifications	Embryonic community of fact-checkers	Verificat	High school students	Non-formal	

<a href="#">Toolbox</a>	Toolbox with basic elements to be able to check the false news that arrives	Toolbox	Maldita	All publics	Informal	
<a href="#">Me, Doctor</a>	Compilation of comics against scientific hoaxes	Comics	Maldita	All audiences	Informal	
<a href="#">Don't play with "fake news"</a>	This book presents, in a simple and illustrated way, the world of "fake news" or false news to be understood by younger people	Book	Jacqueline Sánchez - Carrero	Youth	Informal	
<a href="#">#AMiNoMenganyen Awareness</a>	Campaign that aims to awaken Raise a critical spirit and promote a responsible use of technology, media and social networks	Awareness campaign	CAC	Youth & citizenship in general	Informal	

# Interview results

To provide qualitative information to this part of the study, as well as to know the impact, results and lessons Learned from some of the mapped interventions, the following interviews have been carried out:

Name	Entity	Brief Description
Esther Subias	<a href="#">Colectic</a>	Coordinator of techno-pedagogical and European projects. In 2020 she was involved in the European project on disinformation " <a href="#">Get your facts straight</a> " whose beneficiaries were teachers, students and families.
Nereida Carrillo	<a href="#">Learn to Check</a>	Freelance journalist, specialized in Internet and social networks, and director of Learn to Check. Through this platform they offer resources and training to teachers, librarians, and students, and have given various trainings on <i>fake news</i> and disinformation in digital and face-to-face format throughout the Spanish territory.

## Target Audience

The target audience for the interventions were, on the one hand, were young people and their families, and on the other, teachers, librarians and students. In the first case, families were also included in the training to create awareness around responsible parenthood in the face of the phenomenon of disinformation, especially in families at risk of social exclusion. In this sense, two agendas were created, one for young people and one for families, which converged in the final sessions. The objective was to train, in addition to young people, also their families so that they were more involved in education and support on social networks and digital channels.

Additionally, the Learn to Check interventions initially consisted of several media education and digital literacy workshops aimed at young people. As a result of these workshops, an interest and need for training in this field was detected. Thus followed the decision to expand the target audience to teachers, who are references and have the ability to incorporate these topics in the classroom, and librarians, who are knowledge managers, also for digital knowledge.

Both interviewees emphasize that there is a high educational demand on this subject, detecting an invested interest on the part of the teachers and librarians to train and, in turn, to be able to train. They also emphasize that the new proposed formations are very well accepted and registrations are completed quickly, without being widely disseminated.



## **Agenda of the Interventions**

The interventions follow a similar script: first, the phenomenon of disinformation is dealt with (what it is, typologies, causes and consequences) and then digital verification is introduced (how to react and how to verify content). In the courses for trainers, a section is included where resources are provided to implement digital verification in the classroom.

In both interviews, the importance of demonstrating the phenomenon of disinformation with practical cases and close to the target people is highlighted. In the training for teachers, for example, to address the issue of disinformation in the classroom from the syllabus of each subject: in mathematics, to talk about how errors in statistics can become disinformation, in philosophy to reflect on the ethical implications of disinformation, in English to talk about this phenomenon, or in physics and chemistry to dismantle the hoax that claimed that snow was plastic. In courses aimed at students, it is recommended to use examples that interest young people or in which there are young references, talk about the social networks they normally use (Instagram or Tik-Tok) and use close examples (do not talk, for example, of hoaxes in international politics).

An example of activity was to organize a competition or contest in which you have to create false news to deceive other people, who have already been trained previously. In this sense, the challenge lies, on the one hand, in creating a hoax that avoids the alarms that lead to suspicion that it is false news; and on the other, in identifying a hoax that has been carefully crafted.

## **Young people and media literacy**

The interviewees agree that media literacy is not worked much on and that it is necessary to equip young people with skills to critically analyse information. In this sense, they highlight the importance of working and training the critical spirit among the youngest.

To do this, they emphasize that training through workshops and other types of interventions in dealing with the phenomenon of disinformation is essential with cases and practical exercises that stimulate the participants and provide them with access to knowledge.

## Recommendations

Thinking about future interventions, the interviewees made the following recommendations:

- In resources on disinformation, it should explain phenomena of disinformation and the business behind and the existence of algorithms that manufacture tailor-made realities based on their own behaviour and of the economic interests of others. Understanding the phenomenon and how it works, as well as having this information available, was a strategy highly valued by the teachers.
- There is a large gap between the world of young people and that of adults. Young people very quickly enter certain online spaces that take time to reach the adult world, who find it difficult understand and react to. For this reason, there have been proposals to launch a type of alert network, promoting the leadership of young people or training them so that they can be opinion leaders.
- Creative projects, very practical and with close examples, can work very well with young people between 12 and 15 years old.
- In any intervention it is important to have a training and knowledge part where concepts and techniques are learned, and a challenge part where what has been learned is put into practice.

# Conclusions

The review of literature and academic articles carried out in the first part of this study shows us a worrisome situation in a country whose citizens have been strongly impacted by the phenomenon of misinformation, which has increased during the Covid-19 pandemic. This situation is aggravated for several reasons:

- (1) The lack of credibility of citizens in public institutions and the media,
- (2) The increase in the number of people who get information through social networks, and the increase of disinformation on these platforms,
- (3) The high political polarization of citizens and the lack of unity of political parties in the management of the pandemic,
- (4) Lack of knowledge or generalized non-use of verification platforms.

The situation is critical and the need to combat disinformation is urgent. To this end, media and information literacy is necessary to create critical users who are able to identify and not spread disinformation, as well as to alert their environment to the danger of this phenomenon. In this sense, teachers and librarians have a fundamental role to play in the media and information education of citizens.

On the other hand, from the mapping and review of resources and interventions on disinformation, the following conclusions emerge:

- There is a great interest and educational demand in training on disinformation for both students and educators.
- Unlike other countries, there is very little training aimed at library personnel in the Spanish state.
- Teachers seek general training on disinformation and resources on how to transfer this information in the classroom: practical ideas, recommendations...
- A game-like practical dynamic can work very well for our target audience, but it is recommended to include a space for knowledge and reflection.
- Studies and information show that materials, resources, and initiatives are still required to foster the development of young people's skills to critically analyse information.
- Teachers value the development of skills and content that help students understand the reason for disinformation and the interests behind it.

- There is a huge gap between young and old. It is important to strengthen the leadership of young people so that they can act as an alert and guide for others.
- The hands-on training works well, using many examples from famous Tik-Tok, Instagram, and youtubers, on topics close to the students.

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